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ABSTRACT 
Impracticability and frustration of purpose are important 
exceptions to the principle that contracts must be performed, come 
what may. At common law, the general rule is that the promisor bears 
the risk that a contract may become more burdensome or less 
desirable to her as a result of changes in circumstances for which she 
did not plan. But when an extraordinary circumstance renders a 
promised performance so different from what was to be expected that 
it changes the essential nature of that performance, the courts hold 
that justice requires a departure from the general rule. 
The law of impracticability and frustration, as it has evolved under 
section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and section 
261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Second Restatement), 
is more confusing than it should be and frequently and unnecessarily 
fails to achieve its purpose. Some easily implemented changes to the 
rules will render outcomes in these cases more predictable and more 
just. 
INTRODUCTION 
“What a revolting development this is.” 
– The Great Gildersleeve1 
n 1868 in St. Paul, a contractor named Leonard agreed to construct 
a building for Stees and others on their lot on Minnesota Street.2 
 
1 The Great Gildersleeve was the lead character in a radio show of the same name some 
years ago. See The Great Gildersleeve, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The 
_Great_Gildersleeve (last modified Sept. 18, 2012). 
I
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After Leonard and his co-venturers had built the building to a height 
of three stories, it collapsed.3 They tried again, and it collapsed again. 
The problem, it soon appeared, was quicksand.4 
From Leonard’s standpoint, this was a revolting development. He 
had made an unqualified contractual commitment to build the 
specified building on the designated site. As things turned out, in 
order for him to do it, the entire site would have to be drained5 – 
presumably at great expense in relation to the contract price. There 
are indications in the opinion that he foresaw he might encounter 
quicksand.6 From the fact that he made an absolute commitment, it 
can be inferred that he reckoned that he would not. It may be that 
Stees and the other owners made the same assumption; they furnished 
plans for a building that could not be built on quicksand. But this is 
far from clear. 
When Stees sued to enforce the contract, Leonard defended on the 
basis that the plaintiffs’ plans called for footings that were inadequate 
to support the building on quicksand.7 The court was unimpressed. If 
the specifications for the footings were flawed, it was up to Leonard 
to substitute proper footings.8 If the building could not be built on 
quicksand, it was Leonard’s duty to drain the site.9 Pacta sunt 
servanda. Contracts are to be performed. 
If a man bind himself, by a positive, express contract, to do an act in 
itself possible, he must perform his engagement, unless prevented 
by the act of God, the law, or the other party to the contract. No 
hardship, no unforeseen hindrance, no difficulty short of absolute 
impossibility, will excuse him from doing what he has expressly 
agreed to do.10 
The court went on to note: 
This doctrine may sometimes seem to bear heavily upon 
contractors; but, in such cases, the hardship is attributable, not to the 
law, but to the contractor himself, who has improvidently assumed 
an absolute, when he might have undertaken only a qualified, 
 
2 See Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 449, 449 (1874). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 455. 
6 Id. at 455–56. 
7 Id. at 455. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 49. 
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liability. The law does no more than enforce the contract as the 
parties have made it.11 
If Stees v. Leonard were tried today, Leonard might still lose, but 
he would not be at such a desperate disadvantage. The doctrine of 
impossibility applied in the original case has given way to the 
doctrine of impracticability. As stated in the leading case of Mineral 
Park Land Co. v. Howard, in which a contractor who had agreed to 
extract earth and gravel from a particular site unexpectedly 
encountered the water table: 
 A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not 
practicable, and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at 
excessive and reasonable cost. We do not mean to intimate that the 
defendants could excuse themselves by showing the existence of 
conditions which would make the performance of their obligation 
more expensive than they had anticipated . . . . But, where the 
difference in cost is as great as here, and has the effect, as found, of 
making performance impracticable, the situation is not different 
from a total absence of earth and gravel.12 
What exactly Leonard would have to show now varies with the 
jurisdiction.13 Among the many formulations available, the most 
 
11 Id. In these passages, the court was echoing precedents going back at least to the 
seventeenth century. See, e.g., Paradine v. Jane, (1646) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.) 897 
(“[W]hen the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound 
to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because 
he might have provided against it by his contract.”). 
12 Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 460 (Cal. 1916) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
13 See, e.g., Opera Co. of Bos., Inc, v. Wolf Trap Found. for the Performing Arts, 817 
F.2d 1094, 1102 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[A] party relying on the defense of impossibility of 
performance must establish (1) the unexpected occurrence of an intervening act, (2) such 
occurrence was of such a character that its non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the 
agreement of the parties, and (3) that occurrence made performance impracticable.”); J & 
G Assocs. v. Ritz Camera Ctrs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 9811, 1989 WL 115216, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 3, 1989) (“Discharge by reason of impracticability requires proof of three elements. 
First, the party claiming discharge must establish the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption of the contract. Second, it must be shown that 
continued performance is not commercially practicable. Finally, the party claiming 
discharge must show that it did not expressly or impliedly agree to performance in spite of 
impracticability that would otherwise justify his non-performance.”); Columbian Nat’l 
Title Ins. Co. v. Township Title Servs., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 796, 802 (D. Kan. 1987) 
(“Under [Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 261], performance will not be 
discharged if (1) the promisor caused the impracticability; (2) the promisor had reason to 
foresee the impracticability; or (3) the language or the circumstances indicate that the 
promisor assumed the risk.”); Nebaco, Inc., v. Riverview Realty Co., 482 P.2d 305, 307 
(Nev. 1971) (“[Performance will be excused if the promise] is made impossible or highly 
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careful is found in section 261 of the Second Restatement, which the 
drafters derived from section 2-615 of the UCC: 
 Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made 
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the 
non-occurrence of whic[h] was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made, his duty to render that performance is 
discharged unless the language or the circumstances indicate the 
contrary.14 
The formulations of the defenses of impracticability and frustration 
of purpose in the Second Restatement15 are an improvement over 
most of the others. However, they leave open a lot of important 
questions: 
(1) Frequently, in impracticability and frustration cases, it is clear 
enough what the promisor assumed about the unwelcome 
development. If the matter was not discussed, how can we reliably 
determine what was in the promisee’s mind? Often we can’t. 
(2) If the promisor’s assumption was reasonable, why do we care 
what the promisee assumed? 
(3) What exactly is the significance of the fact that the revolting 
development was foreseeable to the promisor? 
 
impractical by the occurrence of unforeseen contingencies, but if the unforeseen 
contingency is one which the promisor should have foreseen, and for which he should 
have provided, this defense is unavailable to him.” (citation omitted)). 
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). Similarly, section 2-615(a) 
of the UCC provides: 
 Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to 
the preceding section on substituted performance: 
 (a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who 
complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract 
for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence 
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which 
the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign 
or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be 
invalid. 
UCC § 2-615(a) (1978). For useful discussions of this provision and the companion 
provisions of the UCC (sections 2-613, 2-614, and 2-616), see Alphonse M. Squillante & 
Felice M. Congalton, Force Majeure, 80 COM. L.J. 4, 6–7 (1975); sources cited infra notes 
21–22. See generally Brian S. Conneely & Edmond P. Murphy, Sections 2-615 and 2-616 
of the Uniform Commercial Code: Partial Solutions to the Problem of Excuse, 5 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 167 (1976). 
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265 (1981). Section 261 defines 
the defense of impracticability and section 265 the defense of frustration of purpose. 
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(4) Where is the line between a mere increase in the promisor’s 
cost of performance, and a cost increase so severe that (as in 
Mineral Park) it renders performance impracticable? 
(5) What is a “basic assumption”? If the parties assume that an 
event will not occur, and its occurrence renders performance 
impracticable, could their assumption ever fail to be “basic”? 
(6) Other than acting on an unreasonable assumption, what fault on 
the promisor’s part will defeat her defense? 
(7) If an erroneous assumption renders performance impracticable, 
and the language of the contract does not expressly allocate the risk 
of the unwelcome event to the promisor, when will the 
circumstances justify a finding that the promisor assumed that risk 
nevertheless? 
(8) In determining whether and on what terms the promisor’s duty 
is discharged, why are the financial consequences to the promisee 
ignored? 
The comments to the basic provisions, and other provisions of the 
Second Restatement, address some of these questions, but they do not 
narrow the range of uncertainty very much. 
The Second Restatement formulation of the defense of supervening 
frustration is similar to that of impracticability: 
 Where, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is 
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an 
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render 
performance are discharged, unless the language or the 
circumstances indicate the contrary.16 
All of the same questions arise, except that the vexing question of 
whether performance has become impracticable is replaced by the 
somewhat less vexing question of whether the promisor’s principal 
purpose has been substantially frustrated. 
It should be noted at the outset that the rules on impracticability 
and frustration are default rules. A party can waive these defenses by 
agreeing to perform come hell or high water.17 Conversely, the parties 
 
16 Id. § 265. 
17 See id. § 261 cmt. c (“A party may, by appropriate language, agree to perform in 
spite of impracticability that would otherwise justify his non-performance under the rule 
stated in this Section. He can then be held liable for damages although he cannot 
perform.”). Cases enforcing such a clause are collected and the rationale for doing so is 
nicely summarized in Citicorp of N. Am., Inc. v. Lifestyle Commc’ns Corp., 836 F. Supp. 
644, 656 (S.D. Iowa 1993). 
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can agree on exculpatory language, which often takes the form of a 
“force majeure” clause.18Take, for example, this clause in an oil and 
gas lease: 
This lease shall not be terminated in whole or in part, nor lessee 
held liable in damages, because of a temporary cessation of 
production or of drilling operations due to breakdown of equipment 
or due to the repairing of a well or wells, or because of failure to 
comply with any of the express provisions or implied covenants of 
this lease if such failure is the result of the exercise of governmental 
authority, war, armed hostilities, lack of market, act of God, strike, 
civil disturbance, fire, explosion, flood or any other cause 
reasonably beyond the control of lessee.19 
Such clauses, in which the parties make their own law with respect 
to impracticability, supersede the default rules.20 
On the whole, the history of published scholarship concerning 
impracticability and frustration in the United States has been one of 
benign neglect. There have been two small clusters of articles. One 
group appeared after the UCC was promulgated; by and large, the 
authors welcomed section 2-615.21 Another group of articles appeared 
in the 1950s and 1960s after a number of prominent cases were 
decided in England and the United States arising out of Egypt’s 
closure of the Suez Canal and the consequent rerouting of cargo 
 
18 A force majeure clause is meant to “relieve a party from its contractual duties when 
its performance has been prevented by a force beyond its control or when the purpose of 
the contract has been frustrated.” Phillips P.R. Core, Inc. v. Tradax Petroleum Ltd., 782 
F.2d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 1985). 
19 L & L Energy Co. v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, 2010 Ark. App. 422, at 3. 
20 See infra notes 29 and 43 for a discussion of some of the problems promisors have 
encountered in trying to enforce force majeure clauses. Hell-or-high-water clauses and 
force majeure clauses are not the only possibilities. The parties may agree, for example, 
that if conditions are unexpectedly encountered that render performance as stipulated in 
the contract impracticable, the promisor will not be discharged. Rather, the time for 
performance or the contract price will be “equitably adjusted” by a procedure set forth in 
the contract. 
21 See Richard W. Duesenberg, Contract Impracticability: Courts Begin to Shape § 2-
615, 32 BUS. LAW. 1089 (1977); William D. Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-
615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 COM. L.J. 75 (1974); Thomas R. Hurst, 
Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks 
Under UCC Section 2-615, 54 N.C. L. REV. 545 (1976); Comment, Contractual Flexibility 
in a Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615 from the Common Law, 72 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1032 (1978); Conneely & Murphy, supra note 14; John B. Haley, Note, UCC § 2-
615: Sharp Inflationary Increases in Cost as Excuse from Performance of Contract, 50 
NOTRE DAME LAW 297 (1974). 
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ships.22 Since then, considering the frequency with which cases 
involving the two defenses have surfaced in the reports, the scholarly 
output has been slight. Over the whole period since Mineral Park was 
decided in 1916, there is not one article that stands out. If there is a 
commentator whose work has influenced the development of the law 
to a noticeable extent, it would be Arthur Corbin. His multi-volume 
treatise is cited twelve times in the comments and the reporter’s notes 
that accompany the major sections of the Second Restatement.23 
Apart from Professor Corbin, Professor Williston, and their 
successors, whose comments are distributed throughout the pertinent 
volumes of their respective treatises,24 nobody in any recent year has 
made a serious attempt in print to view the doctrines whole.25 
 
22 See Harold J. Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices 
in International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1963); Robert L. Birmingham, A Second 
Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in 
the Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1393 (1969); John Henry Schlegel, Of 
Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things—The Doctrine of 
Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419 (1969). Aluminum Co. of America 
v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), also attracted a lot of scholarly 
attention. See infra notes 200–18 and accompanying text. 
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178–315 (1981) (citing 6 ARTHUR 
LINTON CORBIN, CONTRACTS ch. 74 (1962 & Supp. 1980)). 
24 See generally 30 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004); 14 
JAMES P. NEHF, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2001). 
25 The most ambitious article published in the last forty years is Richard A. Posner & 
Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 83, 94–97 (1977). In this article, the authors, 
approaching the defenses from the perspective of the University of Chicago Law School, 
argue that the law should be reoriented in such a fashion that a promisor is entitled to 
claim the defense only if the promisee is the superior risk spreader. The article has not 
been influential. More recently, Professor Melvin Eisenberg of Harvard Law School 
published a thoughtful piece devoted to two topics, tacit assumptions and the remedies of 
the promisee if the promisor’s duty to perform is discharged. Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207 (2009) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg 2009]. Some of his major contentions are discussed in the present 
article. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. The article led to an unrewarding 
exchange between Professor Victor Goldberg of Columbia Law School and Professor 
Eisenberg. See Victor P. Goldberg, Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 359 (2010); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, 
Impracticability, and Frustration–Professor Goldberg Constructs an Imaginary Article, 
Attributes It to Me, and Then Criticizes It, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 383 (2010). In another 
recent article, Professor Goldberg argues that once a promisor has been found to be 
entitled to discharge on grounds of impracticability, the promisee should not be entitled 
either to restitution or to compensation for harm resulting from the discharge. Victor P. 
Goldberg, After Frustration: Three Cheers for Chandler v. Webster, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1133, 1135–36 (2011). He maintains that this would entail a change in the law. Id. at 
1137–65. In an earlier article that Professor Goldberg does not cite, Professor Andrew Kull 
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In this Article, it is submitted that the law of revolting 
developments, as it has evolved under the Second Restatement and 
UCC section 2-615, is more confusing and uncertain than it has to be, 
and that it frequently and unnecessarily fails to accomplish its 
purpose. Vague and variable though the idea of justice surely is, few 
of us would want to live in a system in which the law does not strive 
toward justice. And a key function of contract law is to introduce an 
element of predictability into human affairs. The whole point of 
entering into a contract is to bring an aspect of the future under some 
degree of control.26 If it is possible that modest changes in the rules 
that define the defenses of impracticability and frustration will render 
outcomes in the cases in which these defenses are claimed more 
certain and more fair, the effort should be made. 
Part I of this Article addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Second Restatement provisions. Part II makes the case for an 
alternative formulation. These two parts are brought together in a 
brief conclusion. 
I 
THE RESTATEMENT 
A. Strengths of the Restatement Formulations 
Warts and all, the Second Restatment provisions on 
impracticability and frustration of purpose are in many respects well 
crafted. They address important problems and further important 
objectives. They make due allowance for fault on the promisor’s side, 
and for circumstances under which the promisor can fairly be held to 
have assumed extraordinary risks in the contract, and they deal in a 
principled way with the troublesome issue of foreseeability. 
 
argued that, to the contrary, American courts generally do exactly what Professor 
Goldberg thinks they should do. See Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall 
Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1991). 
26 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND 24 (1998); E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.3 (3d ed. 1999) (“[f]rom the perspective of the parties 
themselves, the function [of contract law] might have been viewed . . . as aiding them in 
planning for the future by protecting their expectations.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.7 (7th ed. 2007). 
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1. Important Objectives 
As the drafters cogently observe in the introductory note to the 
chapter on impracticability and frustration, 
An extraordinary circumstance may make performance so vitally 
different from what was reasonably to be expected as to alter the 
essential nature of that performance. In such a case . . . justice 
requires a departure from the general rule that the obligor bear the 
risk that the contract may become more burdensome or less 
desirable.27 
If there were no default rules for revolting developments, a 
promisor wishing to undertake a risky course of action would have 
only two choices—try to protect herself in the contract with 
exculpatory language or bite the bullet and make an absolute 
commitment. There are good reasons not to force this choice on the 
promisor. 
First, unsophisticated contractors, like the builder in Stees v. 
Leonard, will be blind-sided. Perhaps this is not the problem it once 
was. Presumably it is more likely now than it was in 1868 that a 
contractor will consult an attorney first. But not everyone will, and if 
the default rule is pacta sunt servanda, some prospective promisors 
will get hammered, since they do not know enough to try to negotiate 
for exculpatory language. 
Second, a prospective promisee may refuse to consent to 
exculpatory language or may set the price too high. The result may be 
that some prospective promisors will be deterred from entering into 
contracts involving normal risks for fear that something unexpected 
will happen, and they will get hammered. 
Third, promisors will rely on force majeure clauses, which cannot 
safely be relied on in all jurisdictions.28 Some courts have used tenets 
like ejusdem generis to gut force majeure clauses or have arbitrarily 
 
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (1981) (emphasis 
added). On doing justice as the fundamental purpose of the defenses of impracticability 
and frustration, see Opera Co. of Bos., Inc. v. Wolf Trap Found. for the Performing Arts, 
817 F.2d 1094, 1099 (4th Cir. 1987); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 563 F.2d 
588, 599 (3rd Cir. 1977); and J. Denson Smith, Some Practical Aspects of the Doctrine of 
Impossibility, 32 ILL. L. REV. 672, 675 (1938). On the topic of these defenses as a last 
resort, when circumstances render performance fundamentally different from what was 
bargained for, see Cook v. Deltona Corp., 753 F.2d 1552, 1557–58 (11th Cir. 1985); and 
Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Mass. 1974). 
28 In many jurisdictions, such clauses are routinely enforced. See Squillante & 
Congalton, supra note 14, at 2–6 (citing cases). 
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held that such clauses do not apply to developments that were 
foreseeable but not specifically enumerated.29 
If it is important, from the standpoint of justice, that contracting 
parties be protected against contingencies which they reasonably 
failed to anticipate and which turn the deal into a nightmare, default 
rules will be required to protect the parties.30 
 
29 “Under the rule of ejusdem generis, general words following particular or specific 
terms are restricted in meaning to those things or matters that are of the same kind as those 
first mentioned; that is, general terms following an enumeration of specific terms are 
construed with reference only to the specific terms . . . .” 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 416 
(1999). On the application of this doctrine to force majeure clauses generally, see the 
leading New York state case, Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 
1987). In Kel Kim, the lessee of a roller skating rink covenanted to acquire and maintain 
liability insurance with one million dollars of coverage. Id. at 295. During the lease term, 
the lessee’s insurance company notified it that for reasons that did not reflect in any way 
on the lessee, it did not intend to renew the policy. Id. at 295–96. The lessee tried to obtain 
insurance elsewhere in the required amount but was unsuccessful. Id. at 296. When the 
lessor was informed of the problem, it threatened to oust the lessee. Id. The lessee sought a 
declaratory judgment, invoking the force majeure clause in the lease, which stipulated: 
 If either party to this Lease shall be delayed or prevented from the 
performance of any obligation through no fault of their own by reason of labor 
disputes, inability to procure materials, failure of utility service, restrictive 
governmental laws or regulations, riots, insurrection, war, adverse weather, Acts 
of God, or other similar causes beyond the control of such party, the performance 
of such obligation shall be excused for the period of the delay. 
Id. The court held that on the facts, the force majeure clause afforded the lessee no 
defense. 
[C]ontractual force majeure clauses—or clauses excusing nonperformance due to 
circumstances beyond the control of the parties—under the common law provide 
a . . . narrow defense. Ordinarily, only if the force majeure clause specifically 
includes the event that actually prevents a party’s performance will that party be 
excused. Here, of course, the contractual provision does not specifically include 
plaintiff’s inability to procure and maintain insurance. Nor does this inability fall 
within the catchall “or other similar causes beyond the control of such party.” 
The principle of interpretation applicable to such clauses is that the general 
words are not to be given expansive meaning; they are confined to things of the 
same kind or nature as the particular matters mentioned. 
Id. at 296–97 (citations omitted); accord Excelsior Motor Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Sound 
Equip., 73 F.2d 725, 726 (7th Cir. 1934); Team Mktg. USA Corp. v. Power Pact, LLC, 
839 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245–46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
30 Decisions like Kel Kim and Excelsior put undue pressure on the draftsman: 
It would be costly if not impossible to lay out [a truly exhaustive force majeure 
clause]. There are a number of possible contingencies, the occurrence of which 
can be contemplated by both parties, and provision for the effects of which 
would be desirable to one or both of the parties. Wars, embargoes, changes in 
government rules and regulations, destruction of key supply facilities, 
hyperinflation, etc., can all lead to effects on the supply and demand of [a] 
commodity . . . which would make performance by one or both parties 
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2. Fault 
Under the Second Restatement provisions, a promisor’s duty is not 
discharged if her performance was frustrated or rendered 
impracticable as a result of her fault. This seems entirely appropriate 
for a defense based on the equities.31 
The most common allegation of fault in cases is some version of 
“you brought it on yourself.” A useful example is the Chicago depot 
case.32 Two major railroads ran passenger trains into and out of 
Chicago.33 Though they were losing money on the service and cutting 
back when they could, the Interstate Commerce Commission would 
not let them discontinue it altogether.34 Looking to save money, they 
agreed that railroad A would share its Chicago passenger terminal 
with railroad B for ten years, for a price.35 Then came Amtrak, which 
neither party foresaw, and a chance for each to turn over its Chicago 
passenger service to Amtrak and get out of the business, which they 
did.36 B, arguing that its primary purpose in contracting for the use of 
A’s terminal was now frustrated, stopped paying rent.37 The court 
held that B was not entitled to a discharge.38 B’s decision to transfer 
away its passenger business was a rational business decision, but it 
was a business decision. If B was now going to have to pay rent for a 
 
unattractive. These contingencies could all conceivably be listed in a contract 
along with the possible occurrences of each and the nature of performance in 
each instance. 
Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse 
Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 154 (1977). Professor Joskow observes that it would make 
more sense to have a rule that would render all of that unnecessary. For a collection of 
force majeure clauses with commentary, see Squillante & Congalton, supra note 14, at 9, 
43. Some of those clauses would not fare well before a court favorably disposed toward 
the doctrine of ejusdem generis. 
31 See supra note 27 and accompanying text on doing justice as the fundamental 
purpose of the defenses of impracticability and frustration. 
32 Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Chi. & N. W. Transp. Co., 263 N.W.2d 189 
(Wis. 1978). 
33 Id. at 190. 
34 Id. at 194. 
35 Id. at 191. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 192. 
38 Id. at 196. 
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while for the use of a depot it could not use, it had brought the 
problem on itself.39 
3. The Allocation of Extraordinary Risks 
The Second Restatement default rules allocate “normal” risks like 
market shifts and changes in the promisor’s general financial 
condition to the promisor, but provide for discharge of the promisor’s 
duty in extraordinary situations if certain conditions are met. One of 
those conditions is that the contract terms and the circumstances must 
not “indicate the contrary.”40 Comment c to section 261 elaborates on 
this: “A party may, by appropriate language, agree to perform in spite 
of impracticability that would otherwise justify his non-performance 
under the rule . . . . Even absent an express agreement, a court may 
decide, after considering all the circumstances, that a party impliedly 
assumed such a greater obligation.”41 Interpreting this language and 
the corresponding language in UCC section 2-615, which words the 
condition somewhat differently,42 courts have not hesitated to give 
effect to language in the contract expressly allocating to the promisor 
the risk that a particular extraordinary event will occur.43 
 
39 Id. at 194; see also Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 267 n.7 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (national-brand brewer that acquired the rights to a competing brand and 
ran it into the ground in order to maximize profits on its own brand could not then defend 
on the ground of impossibility); Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 69 (Utah 1982) 
(promisor could not defeat promisee’s claim to an option on a designated parcel by 
changing the designation of the parcel on its plat); Liner v. Armstrong Homes of 
Bremerton, Inc., 579 P.2d 367, 370 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (on contractor’s counterclaim 
for breach, owners could not defend on grounds of impracticability, where the obstacle to 
their performance was their own material misrepresentation). See generally Henry Chajet, 
Comment, Contractual Excuse Based On a Failure of Presupposed Conditions, 14 DUQ. 
L. REV. 234, 244–48 (1976). 
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
41 Id. at cmt. c. 
42 See UCC § 2-615 (1987) (“Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater 
obligation . . . [d]elay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is not a 
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made 
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency.” (emphasis added)). 
43 In Rose v. Freeway Aviation, a lease on a building to be used for repairing airplanes 
provided that the lessor “shall be responsible for . . . maintaining the leased premises in at 
least a good condition as they are presently.” Rose v. Freeway Aviation, 585 P.2d 907, 907 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). In the course of the lease a gasoline truck crashed into the building, 
doing major damage to the doors and frame. Id. Despite repeated requests by the lessee, 
the lessor declined to do anything to restore the building to its original condition. Id. In the 
lessee’s suit, the lessor sought to defend on grounds of impracticability. Id. at 908. The 
court held, not surprisingly, for the lessee: 
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Courts have also sometimes astutely inferred from the contract 
language that the parties intended the promisor to assume the risk that 
an unwelcome event will occur. In Publicker Industries Inc. v. Union 
Carbide, the parties’ contract for the sale of ethanol to Publicker 
contained an escalation clause tying the contract price to increases in 
Carbide’s standard cost for ethylene used in the production of ethanol 
at its Texas City, Texas plant.44 The clause also placed a cap on any 
such escalation in the price.45 Carbide alleged that, as a result of 
action by the OPEC cartel to restrict the supply of oil, the cost of 
ethylene had risen much faster than contemplated.46 Judge Weiner 
refused to conclude that the cost increases had rendered performance 
impracticable, holding that “the existence of a specific provision 
which put a ceiling on contract price increases resulting from a rise in 
the cost of Ethylene impels the conclusion that the parties intended 
that the risk of a substantial and unforeseen rise in its cost would be 
borne by the seller.”47 
Proceeding under the UCC and the Second Restatement, some 
courts have gone a step further and have allocated the risk that 
performance will prove to be impracticable to the promisor, even 
though there is no indication that the promisor intended or agreed to 
assume the risk. A well-known case in point is Judge Friendly’s 
opinion in United States v. Wegematic.48 Responding to the 
government’s bid for a large order for computers, Wegematic 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary . . . defines “maintain” as “ * * * keep in repair; keep up; 
preserve; preserve from lapse, decline, failure or cessation; provide for; rebuild; 
repair; replace * * *.” A covenant to maintain includes a covenant to rebuild. 
 Agreements which are clear and unambiguous will be enforced according to 
their terms and the words used will be given their normal ordinary meaning . . . . 
Freeway did not see fit to restrict its general covenant to maintain, and the case 
does not present any circumstances compelling a conclusion contrary to the 
general rule. 
Id. (citations omitted). For a similar outcome, see, e.g., Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Lawson, 219 
S.E.2d 167, 171–72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975), in which the court denied relief to a cotton 
broker whose suppliers defaulted, where the contract authorized the buyer to cover and sue 
if performance was prevented by a contingency not mentioned in the force majeure clause, 
and the clause was silent as to defaults by the broker’s suppliers. 
44 Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 989, 990 
(E.D. Pa. 1975). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 991–92. 
47 Id. at 992. 
48 United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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characterized its machine, which was still in development, as “a truly 
revolutionary system utilizing all of the latest technical advances.”49 
It represented that “maintenance problems are minimized by the use 
of highly reliable magnetic cores for not only the high speed memory 
but also logical elements and registers.”50 Wegematic got the 
contract. 
The contract contained a strict deadline reinforced with a liquidated 
damages clause.51 Wegematic first reported that the computers would 
be late and then announced that, due to unforeseen engineering 
difficulties, performance had become impracticable.52 The Second 
Circuit declined to let Wegematic off the hook, saying: 
We see no basis for thinking that when an electronics system is 
promoted by its manufacturer as a revolutionary breakthrough, the 
risk of the revolution’s occurrence falls on the purchaser; the 
reasonable supposition is that it has already occurred or, at least, 
that the manufacturer is assuring the purchaser that it will be found 
to have when the machine is assembled . . . .53 
Judge Friendly continued: 
Acceptance of defendant’s argument would mean that though a 
purchaser makes his choice because of the attractiveness of a 
manufacturer’s representation and will be bound by it, the 
manufacturer is free to express what are only aspirations and 
gamble on mere probabilities of fulfillment without any risk of 
liability. In fields of developing technology, the manufacturer 
would thus enjoy a wide degree of latitude with respect to 
performance while holding an option to compel the buyer to pay if 
the gamble should pan out. We do not think this the common 
understanding—above all as to a contract where the manufacturer 
expressly agreed to liquidated damages for delay and authorized the 
purchaser to resort to other sources in the event of non-delivery.54 
The court held that Wegematic’s defense based on impracticability 
had no merit because Wegematic had assumed the risk. 
 
49 Id. at 675. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 676. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 676–77 (citation omitted). For a discussion of the assumption of risk in 
impracticability cases, see generally John M. Vogel, Impossibility of Performance–A 
Closer Look, 9 PUB. CONT. L.J. 110, 123–24, 127–34 (1977).  
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4. Foreseeability 
Many courts have said and held that proof that a revolting 
development was “foreseeable” or “reasonably foreseeable” to the 
promisor defeats the defenses.55 A leading case is Lloyd v. Murphy, in 
which Justice Traynor wrote for the California Supreme Court: 
The purpose of a contract is to place the risks of performance upon 
the promisor, and the relation of the parties, terms of the contract, 
and circumstances surrounding its formation must be examined to 
determine whether it can be fairly inferred that the risk of the event 
that has supervened to cause the alleged frustration was not 
reasonably foreseeable. If it was foreseeable there should have been 
provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such a provision 
gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.56 
The practice of setting up foreseeability as an insurmountable 
obstacle to discharge has been roundly criticized in the literature.57 In 
the introductory note, the drafters of the Second Restatement rejected 
the proposition that foreseeability bars discharge: “The fact that the 
event was unforeseeable is significant in suggesting that its non-
occurrence was a basic assumption. However, the fact that it was 
 
55 See, e.g., E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441 (S. D. Fla. 1975) 
(“If a contingency is foreseeable, it and its consequences are taken outside the scope of 
UCC § 2-615, because the party disadvantaged by fruition of the contingency might have 
protected himself in his contract . . . .”); Berline v. Waldschmidt, 156 P.2d 865, 867–68 
(Kan. 1945) (“[The doctrine of commercial frustration] is predicated upon the fundamental 
premise of giving relief in a situation where the parties could not reasonably protect 
themselves by the terms of their contract against contingencies which later arose, and . . . it 
never applies to give such relief where the risk of the event that has supervened to cause 
the alleged frustration was reasonably foreseeable[,] and could and should have been 
anticipated by the parties and provision made therefore within the four corners of the 
agreement which it is contended should be supplemented through operation and 
application of the doctrine. If the events relied upon as bringing the doctrine into force and 
effect appear to have been reasonably foreseeable and controllable by the parties, they may 
not invoke its principles as a defense to escape their obligations and the contract is 
enforceable in accordance with the provisions to be found therein.”); see also Specialty 
Beverages, L.L.C. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 537 F.3d 1165, 1176 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
defense does not apply if the promisor had any reason to anticipate the facts that rendered 
performance impossible.”). 
56 Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 54 (Cal. 1944). 
57 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omissions in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. 
REV. 860, 884–87 (1968); Hurst, supra note 21, at 567–69; Joskow, supra note 30, at 157; 
Stewart Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812, 833–
38 (1961). 
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foreseeable, or even foreseen, does not, of itself, argue for a contrary 
conclusion . . . .”58 
The drafters’ approach is entirely sound. Couching the inquiry in 
terms of foreseeability, rather than in terms of whether the promisor 
acted reasonably in disregarding the risk, leads to unpredictable 
results, and, not uncommonly, bad ones.59 
B. Weaknesses in the Restatement Formulations 
Notwithstanding their merits, the Second Restatement provisions 
fall short in four important respects. First, they assign too much 
significance to the state of mind of the promisees with regard to the 
promisors’ over-optimistic assumptions, and not enough to the 
reasonableness of those assumptions. Second, they cloud the issue of 
when the promisor’s increased costs rise to the level necessary to 
make out a case of impracticability. Third, they purport to treat events 
and conditions differently, without an adequate reason to do so. 
Finally, they do not sufficiently focus attention on the need, if justice 
is to be done, to protect the legitimate interests of the promisee as 
well as the promisor. 
1. Shared Basic Assumption 
The Second Restatement formulations of the defenses60 require the 
promisor to show that her mistaken assumption was “basic.”61 As the 
law has evolved, starting with the case of Taylor v. Caldwell,62 the 
promisor must show not only that the assumption was basic, but also 
that both parties made the same assumption. 
 
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (1981). Interestingly, 
and somewhat surprisingly, the drafters of the UCC took the opposite view. Official 
comment 4 to section 2-615 states: “Increased cost alone does not excuse performance, 
unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency . . . .” UCC § 2-615 cmt. 4 
(1978). 
59 See infra text accompanying notes 222–23. 
60 See supra note 14. 
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261. This seemingly vague requirement 
has given rise to very little trouble—perhaps because, if the failure of the assumption 
renders performance so different from what could reasonably have been expected that the 
courts are willing to say that it has become impracticable, that is enough in their view to 
warrant treating the assumption as “basic.” Cf. id. § 152 cmt. b (dealing with mutual 
mistake). 
62 Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.) 309. I am grateful to Robert 
Lloyd for putting me on the path to Taylor v. Caldwell. 
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In the celebrated case of Taylor v. Caldwell, Caldwell, an 
impresario, contracted with Taylor, the owner of the Surrey Gardens 
in London, for the use of the gardens and hall to put on four grand 
fetes and concerts.63 Before the fourth could be held, the hall burned 
down.64 Caldwell brought an action for damages. He was probably 
optimistic about his chances, since the general rule as the law then 
stood was that “[w]here there is a positive contract to do a thing, not 
in itself unlawful, the contractor must perform it or pay damages for 
not doing it, although in consequence of unforeseen accidents, the 
performance of his contract has become unexpectedly burdensome or 
even impossible.”65 
How disappointing for Caldwell, then, that the court chose his case 
in which to announce a new general rule: “[I]n contracts in which the 
performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or 
thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance 
arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the 
performance.”66 It was apparent, the court said, that the parties—that 
is, both of them—had “contracted on the basis” that the hall would 
exist on all four relevant dates.67 That being so, an implied condition 
to that effect must be read into the contract, and since the condition 
was not fulfilled as to the fourth date, Taylor was entitled to a directed 
verdict.68 
For many years after Taylor v. Caldwell, the courts in England and 
the United States analyzed the problems now addressed by the rules 
about impracticability and frustration in terms of implied 
conditions.69 Eventually, under the influence of Corbin and others,70 
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 314. 
67 Id. at 310–11 (Caldwell, J.). 
68 Id. at 315. 
69 See Hawkland, supra note 21, at 75–76 (tracing this evolution). 
70 In a memorable address subsequently published in the Harvard Law Review, Mr. 
Justice Holmes condemned in strong terms the practice of deciding cases based on implied 
conditions: 
You can always imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? Is it 
because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or 
because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of 
yours . . . . Such matters really are battle grounds . . . where the decision can do 
no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place. 
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the law moved away from that approach, to the rules in their present 
form. However, a vestige of the old way of looking at the problems 
lives on, here as in the law of mutual mistake,71 in the requirement 
that both parties have assumed that something would occur that did 
not in fact occur.72 
The requirement of a shared basic assumption works better in some 
situations than in others. In the impracticability and frustration cases, 
it is sometimes plain that the promisee made the same basic 
assumption as the promisor. Consider, for example, City of Savage v. 
Formanek.73 The City of Savage (City) persuaded the Formaneks and 
other owners of wetland property to agree to a special tax 
assessment.74 The owners were willing to enter into those contracts 
because plans were under way to develop their property.75 It appears 
that they expected to recover the amount they had paid in tax and 
more when they sold their land at a premium. Everyone knew it was 
possible that the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) 
would intervene to block the project and protect the wetlands.76 
Everyone, including the City, thought it would not happen. The city 
engineer specifically told the Formaneks that the City thought it 
would not happen.77 The Corps did intervene,78 and killed the project 
for the indefinite future. The City tried to hold the Formaneks to the 
bargain.79 The court held, under the Second Restatement, for the 
Formaneks: Their primary purpose in entering into the contract had 
 
O.W. Holmes, Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the Dedication of the 
New Hall of the Boston University School of Law: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). In a subsequent article, Professor Page, reasoning 
similarly, argued that in using implied conditions to justify a defense for promisors based 
on impossibility, the courts were invoking a fiction that was “at best unnecessary and at 
worst misleading.” William Herbert Page, The Development of the Doctrine of 
Impossibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REV. 589, 598–99 (1920). 
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981) (“Where a mistake of 
both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract 
was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is 
voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake . . . .”). 
72 Id. 
73 City of Savage v. Formanek, 459 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
74 Id. at 174. 
75 Id. at 173. 
76 Id. at 174. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 175. 
WIRTZ 12/20/2012  12:11 PM 
344 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 325 
been substantially frustrated because of an event both parties clearly 
assumed would not occur.80 
Sometimes, by contrast, it is by no means clear what the promisee 
assumed. An instructive example is Renner v. Kehl.81 The Renners 
were looking for property in Arizona on which to grow jojoba,82 a 
plant that required a lot of water.83 They contracted with the Kehls to 
purchase the Kehls’ leases on a large parcel of fallow land in the 
Arizona desert.84 After the Renners signed the contract, they ran the 
necessary tests, and they discovered it was not feasible to drill wells 
that would reach the water table.85 They sought to get out on grounds 
of mutual mistake.86 The court held for the buyers and granted 
rescission.87 
In the Renner case, the trial judge found that the sellers assumed, 
along with the buyers, that there would be water.88 That finding was 
doubtful at best. There did not seem to be anything in the facts to 
support it, other than the fact that the Kehls knew what the Renners 
hoped to do with the land. But the mere fact that the sellers entered 
into the contract with that knowledge does not tell us what they 
assumed. It may be that the sellers thought, “Well, they’re probably 
right about the water. Good luck to them.” But it may also be that the 
sellers thought, “These people are taking a big risk buying the land to 
grow jojoba without testing for water first. Nothing has been grown 
here since who knows when. Well, it’s their call. Maybe they’re right 
and maybe they’re not. There’s an awfully good chance that they’re 
not. Good luck to them.” Unless they actually said they thought there 
was water, which apparently they did not, there is no way to know 
what the sellers assumed about the water. It was wrong of the trial 
court to ascribe to the sellers any assumption at all.89 
 
80 Id. at 176 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981)). 
81 Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262 (Ariz. 1986). 
82 Pronounced “Ho-HO-ba.” 
83 Renner, 722 P.2d at 264. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. The case was tried as a case of mutual mistake. It could also have been tried as a 
case of existing frustration, since clearly the lack of sufficient water substantially 
frustrated the Renners’ principal purpose in purchasing the leases. 
87 Id. at 267. 
88 Id. at 265. 
89 If the sellers had known that there was no water there and said nothing, their conduct 
would have bordered on fraud. However, if as appears to have been the case, they were 
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The problem is difficult enough when the risk is one to which both 
parties consciously adverted. It is compounded when there is no 
evidence that they gave it any thought. A case on point is Mineral 
Park Land Co. v. Howard.90 Needing earth and gravel to fulfill 
another contract, Howard agreed to pay Mineral Park to let him mine 
and haul away earth and gravel from Mineral Park’s land.91 The land 
was located in California’s Arroyo Seco92—the famously Dry 
Gulch.93 Presumably, neither party dreamed that Howard would hit 
the water table, as he did.94 Is it fair then to say that Mineral Park 
assumed that he would not? 
Some eminent scholars would say that the answer is, “Yes, of 
course.”95 They are comfortable with the notion of “tacit 
assumptions.”96 Professor Farnsworth offers the example of someone 
who steps into a room without checking first to see if the floor is 
there.97 Obviously, she assumed—tacitly, in that she didn’t think 
about it—that a floor would be there. That’s fine, but if liability for 
breach is going to be made to depend on what the promisee assumed 
about some unwelcome development, the analogy to rooms and floors 
is not very satisfying. In fact, the whole enterprise is suspect.98 
That said, whatever one’s position on it, the really important point 
is this: Whether the promisee shared the promisor’s assumption 
should not make any difference. The law is asking the wrong 
question. 
One example is the Transatlantic case, one of a group of cases 
involving shipments of goods that had to be rerouted when the 
Egyptians closed the Suez Canal.99 Transatlantic contracted to carry 
 
merely agnostic on the subject, they were not at fault. Both the trial court and the appellate 
court expressly absolved them of any wrongdoing. Id. at 266. 
90 Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 462 (Cal. 1916). 
91 Id. at 458. 
92 Id. 
93 “Seco” is Spanish for “dry.” 
94 Mineral Park Land Co., 156 P. at 459. 
95 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.3 (4th ed. 2004); Eisenberg 
2009, supra note 25, at 209. 
96 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 95. 
97 Id. 
98 See Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial 
Impracticability: Searching for the “Wisdom of Solomon,” 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1153 
(1987). 
99 Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
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wheat for the United States Department of Agriculture from an 
American port to a port in Iran.100 The route through Suez was the 
“usual and customary” route, and Transatlantic assumed it would be 
able to use the canal.101 While the ship was en route, the Egyptian 
government closed the canal and sank ships in it.102 The carrier had 
no choice but to send the vessel around the horn of Africa, adding 
3,000 miles to what would have already been a 10,000-mile 
voyage.103 Transatlantic sought relief on grounds of 
impracticability.104 
Quite possibly, Transatlantic’s assumption about the canal was 
unreasonable. Egypt had already seized the canal.105 Perhaps the 
government’s representative also thought it would be possible to use 
the canal when she signed the contract. But suppose that in the 
circumstances, at the time the contract was signed, it was 
unreasonable for the carrier simply to assume that. Suppose that the 
buzz in the shipping industry was that you had better plan to go the 
long way around. Transatlantic decided to gamble and quoted the 
government a rate for the charter it knew or should have known it 
would very likely regret. 
If, knowing what Transatlantic had reason to know, a prudent 
carrier would not have done this, the law should not come to its aid. 
This is so, even if the government shared its erroneous assumption. 
The case would be like the famous case involving Rose the Second of 
Aberlone, a supposedly barren cow sold by a farmer to a banker.106 
The cow turned out to be fertile.107 Both parties were mistaken.108 
The court rescinded the contract for that reason.109 Suppose, however, 
there were indications, which every competent farmer would have 
recognized, that Rose was pregnant. Presumably the court would not 
have granted rescission—even if the banker, lacking a farmer’s 
expertise, made the same mistake. 
 
100 Id. at 314. 
101 Id. at 315. 
102 Id. at 314. 
103 Id. at 319. 
104 Id. at 315. 
105 Id. at 314. 
106 Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). 
107 Id. at 920. 
108 Id. at 923. 
109 Id. at 924. 
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When a promisor proceeds on an assumption that she should know 
is not a sound assumption, there should be no discharge on grounds of 
impracticability, even if performance was rendered impracticable and 
even if the promisee made the same assumption. And the converse is 
also true. Suppose the facts in Transatlantic were otherwise. The 
smart money in the shipping industry was betting that Egypt would 
not close the canal, since if it did it would take an economic hit and 
risk retaliation. Egypt would not do so unless further provoked, and 
Israel and the European powers, though they might huff and puff, did 
not have enough at stake to provoke Egypt by declaring war. This 
turned out to be wrong. But suppose that in basing its quote on the 
continuing availability of the canal, Transatlantic had no reason to bet 
against the smart money. The fact that its assumption was reasonable 
should satisfy the law’s requirements. This is so regardless of what 
the shipper assumed. Perhaps the shipper, which happened in this 
instance to be the United States government, had private knowledge 
strongly suggesting that the conventional wisdom was misguided. 
That should in no way prejudice the carrier’s defense. There is no 
reason why the promisor should have to show that the promisee made 
the same assumption she did, if it was reasonable for her to make that 
assumption.110 
2. “Impracticability” 
If the promisor’s erroneous assumption meets the Second 
Restatement’s requirements, she must then prove that its failure to 
materialize rendered her performance “impracticable.” The Second 
Restatement starts from the proposition that the promisor, in making 
her commitment, assumes the risk that things will not turn out exactly 
as she hopes. Specifically, “[t]he continuation of existing market 
conditions and of the financial situation of the parties are . . . not . . . 
[basic] assumptions [for purposes of the rule], so that mere market 
shifts or financial inability do not usually effect discharge . . . .”111 
 
110 It is hard to find, in the literature or cases, an argument in favor of the requirement 
of a shared, basic assumption. Possibly this is because the soundness of the requirement 
has never been seriously questioned. There is a case to be made for it. See infra Appendix. 
111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1981); cf. UCC § 2-615 
cmt. 4 (1978) (“Increased cost alone does not excuse performance [on grounds of 
impracticability] unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters 
the essential nature of the performance.”). 
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That said, however, really radical changes in circumstances can 
trigger the defenses. As the drafters of the Second Restatement 
observe: 
Performance may be impracticable because extreme and 
unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties 
will be involved. A severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies 
due to war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of 
major sources of supply, or the like, which either causes a marked 
increase in cost or prevents performance altogether may bring the 
case within the rule . . . .112 
Then the drafters revert to their original point: 
A mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such 
causes as increased wages, prices of raw materials, or costs of 
construction, unless well beyond the normal range, does not amount 
to impracticability since it is this sort of risk that fixed-price 
contract is intended to cover.113 
By and large, in frustration cases, determining where to draw the 
line has not presented a serious problem. When someone rents a room 
from which he hopes to have a good view of the new king’s 
coronation parade, and the king falls ill and the coronation does not 
take place, without a doubt his primary purpose has been substantially 
frustrated.114 
Drawing the line in impracticability cases has proven much more 
difficult. Groping for a criterion, the courts have tended to focus on 
increased costs. In Mineral Park, for example, where the totally 
unexpected encounter with the water table increased the buyer’s cost 
of extracting gravel tenfold, the court did not hesitate to hold the 
buyer discharged. But in less clear-cut cases, what passes for analysis 
tends to degenerate into a numbers game. 
Consider Transatlantic, the Suez Canal case discussed above. 
When the Egyptians shut down the canal and the carrier had to route 
the ship around the Cape of Good Hope, its costs unquestionably 
increased. Judge Wright wrote for the D.C. Circuit: 
 
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d. 
113 Id. Cases decided under UCC section 2-615 have adopted the same interpretation. 
See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 294 (7th Cir. 
1974) (“We will not allow a party to a contract to escape a bad bargain merely because it 
is burdensome . . . . Barring circumstances not existent here, the buyer has a right to rely 
on the party to the contract to supply him with goods regardless of what happens to the 
market price. That is the purpose for which such contracts are made.”). 
114 Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (Eng.). 
WIRTZ 12/20/2012  12:11 PM 
2012] Revolting Developments 349 
The only factor operating here in appellant’s favor is the added 
expense, allegedly $43,972.00 above and beyond the contract price 
of $305,842.92, of extending a 10,000 mile voyage by 
approximately 3,000 miles. While it may be an overstatement to say 
that increased cost and difficulty of performance never constitute 
impracticability, to justify relief there must be more of a variation 
between expected cost and the cost of performing by an available 
alternative than is present in this case, where the promisor can 
legitimately be presumed to have accepted some degree of 
abnormal risk, and where impracticability is urged on the basis of 
added expense alone.115 
Judge Wright declined to say how, eyeballing the cost figures, he had 
arrived at this judgment. In that respect the opinion he chose to write 
is unfortunately quite typical. 
There were a number of Suez Canal cases, some of them decided in 
English courts. On the issue of quantitative impracticability, the 
courts in some Suez Canal cases appeared to be influenced by 
decisions in other Suez Canal cases. For example: in the American 
Trading case the re-routing of the ship around the horn of Africa 
added $131,978.44 to the cost of a performance for which the shipper 
had agreed to pay $417,327.36.116 The court noted, and seemed to be 
struck by, the fact that the one-third increase was virtually the same as 
the increase in the Transatlantic case discussed above.117 What the 
court did not mention, and probably did not notice, was that the court 
in Transatlantic had held the one-third increase to be insufficient 
without a shred of analysis or justification as to why it was 
insufficient. 
One cannot help wondering whether, in the Suez Canal cases, the 
carriers were penalized because they did the responsible thing. Once 
they were notified that the canal was closed, having ostensibly 
determined that performance was now impracticable, they directed 
the ships to complete the voyage anyway by another, longer route.118 
In so doing, they mitigated the shippers’ damages. Whatever harm 
resulted to the shippers from delay in delivery to the intended 
destination was presumably far less than the harm that would have 
 
115 Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(emphasis added). 
116 American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int’l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 940 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
117 Id. at 943. 
118 Id. at 940; Transatlantic, 363 F.2d at 314–15. 
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resulted if the carriers had returned the goods to the original ports or 
dropped them off somewhere else. But the carriers also weakened 
their case. Recall that the impracticability defense springs from the 
proposition that “a thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it 
is not practicable.”119 It is going to be hard to impress a tribunal that 
something should be held to be “impossible in legal contemplation” 
when you have done it. 
Notwithstanding the peculiar posture of the Suez Canal cases, the 
opinions in those cases have been cited respectfully in a number of 
subsequent opinions dealing with garden-variety impracticability.120 
The practice of deciding cases on this issue by analogy to other 
decided cases, without inquiry into the reasoning or lack of reasoning 
in those cases, has become commonplace. When the percentage 
increase is on the order of five percent,121 perhaps this is harmless. 
When the percentage increase is ten times that, however, the practice 
becomes pernicious. Consider, for example, Iowa Electric Light and 
Power, a case in which the seller claimed impracticability based on a 
cost increase of 52.2%.122 The court rejected the defense, noting that 
in other cases “increases of 50-58 percent have generally not been 
recognized as a basis for excusing or adjusting contractual 
obligations.”123 Thus, the promisor’s impracticability defense failed, 
in a case in which, if the promisor had performed the contract at the 
contract price, it would have incurred a loss on the contract of 
$2,673,125.00.124 
The Iowa Electric Light and Power case illustrates another serious 
problem. Sometimes, as in that case, the promisor proves that due to 
unexpected cost increases, performance would have resulted in 
“hardship,” that is, the cost of performance would have exceeded the 
contract price. Sometimes the promisor does not prove that. On the 
 
119 Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 460 (Cal. 1916). 
120 See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 
1319, 1324–25 (E.D. La. 1981); Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. 
Supp. 129, 139 n.7 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 
1979). 
121 See, e.g., Freidco of Wilmington, Del., Ltd. v. Farmers Bank of State of Del., 529 F. 
Supp. 822, 830 (D. Del. 1981); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 43 N.W.2d 
657, 666 (Neb. 1950), abrogated on other grounds by Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 
495 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1993). 
122 Iowa Electric Light & Power, Co., 467 F. Supp. at 140. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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relevance vel non of hardship, opinions differ, but there is a pattern: 
Proof of hardship does not help the promisor’s case, but the absence 
of such proof hurts it.125 Someone, apparently, is not thinking. It 
seems clear that courts could do with more guidance on this issue than 
they have received to date. 
3. Events and Conditions 
The Second Restatement has two impracticability rules, one for 
events the parties assumed would not occur and one for conditions 
they assumed did not exist.126 It has two frustration rules, similarly 
differentiated. 
Section 266 on “Existing Impracticability or Frustration” provides: 
 (1) Where, at the time a contract is made, a party’s performance 
under it is impracticable without his fault because of a fact of which 
he has no reason to know and the non-existence of which is a basic 
assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to render that 
performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate 
the contrary. 
 (2) Where, at the time a contract is made, a party’s principal 
purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of 
which he has no reason to know and the non-existence of which is a 
basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty of that 
party to render performance arises, unless the language or 
circumstances indicate the contrary.127 
In comment a to section 266, the drafters note two respects in 
which these rules differ from the rules for supervening events: 
First, under the rules stated in this Section, the affected party must 
have had no reason to know at the time the contract was made of the 
facts on which he later relies. Second, the effect of these rules is to 
 
125 Compare id., and Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 352 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788–
90 (N.Y. Special Term 1974) (promisors’ prospective losses dismissed as immaterial), 
with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 563 F.2d 588, 598–99 (3rd Cir. 1977) 
(discharge denied where promisor’s evidence suggested that it would not lose money on 
the contract), and E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 440–41 (S.D. Fla. 
1975) (no impracticability because no proof of hardship). For more on hardship as a factor 
in evaluating impracticability defenses, see infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981) (impracticability for 
supervening occurrences); id. § 266(a) (impracticability for existing conditions). 
127 Id. § 266. 
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prevent a duty from arising in the first place rather than to discharge 
a duty that has already arisen.128 
If the revolting development is an event rather than a condition, the 
promisor must have had “no reason to know” of it when the contract 
is made.129 And this is true, even if both parties made a contrary 
assumption.130 No reason is given for this distinction between events 
and conditions, and it is hard to see what a good reason might be. 
Perhaps the point is that in a case like the quicksand case, it may not 
be reasonable for the contractor to assume that subsurface conditions 
will be benign. But people make unreasonable assumptions about 
events, too. If St. Paul was prone to floods, it might not have been 
reasonable for the builder to assume he would not be flooded out. It 
would seem that the two kinds of developments, events and 
conditions, should be judged by the same standard. 
Further, if the revolting development is a condition and the 
requirements of the rule on existing conditions are met, the 
promisor’s duty is not discharged, as it would be in the case of an 
event. Rather, the duty never arose. No reason is offered for this, 
either. Perhaps the object is to bring the rules on existing 
impracticability and frustration into line with the rule on mutual 
mistake. It is a bit anomalous if the outcome in the jojoba case131 
differs depending on whether the buyers prevail on the ground of 
mutual mistake (so that the contract is rescinded) or existing 
frustration (so that their obligation is discharged). But the problem is 
a minor one, and it would not seem to warrant the creation of a whole 
separate set of rules. 
 
128 Id. at cmt. a. Illustration 8 accompanying section 266 provides qualified approval 
for the result in the hoary old quicksand case, Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494 (1874): 
A contracts with B to build a house on B’s land according to plans furnished by 
A. Because of subsoil conditions, of which A has no reason to know, this cannot 
be done unless the land is drained at great expense. After the house is partly 
completed, it collapses because of these conditions, and A refuses to continue the 
work. The court may determine from all the circumstances, including the fact 
that A furnished the plans, that A is under a duty to build the house in spite of the 
impracticability of doing so, and that A is liable to B for breach of contract . . . . 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266 cmt. b, illus. 8. 
129 Id. § 266. 
130 Id. 
131 Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262 (Ariz. 1986). 
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4. Remedy 
Sitting quietly at the end of the chapter on impracticability and 
frustration, where litigants and their lawyers may not know to look for 
it, is section 272(2) of the Second Restatement, which addresses 
relief, including restitution.132 This section states, “In any case 
governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, if those rules together 
with the rules stated in Chapter 16 will not avoid injustice, the court 
may grant relief on such terms as justice requires including protection 
of the parties’ reliance interests.”133 This provision effectively places 
the entire Second Restatement chapter on remedies at the disposal of 
a promisee who has been damaged by the promisor’s discharge on 
grounds of impracticability under section 261, and authorizes 
additional remedies besides.134 
Section 272(2) has not had a lot of play. The fights are waged over 
discharge, and once that issue is resolved, the promisees almost 
always retire from the field. From the standpoint of fairness, that is 
unfortunate.135 Consider the Asphalt International case.136 Asphalt 
International chartered a tanker from its owner, Enterprise 
Shipping.137 While taking on asphalt alongside a pier in Curacao, the 
vessel was rammed amidships by the bow of another ship and 
sustained extensive damage.138 The shipowner conducted an 
investigation, determined that the cost of repairing the ship was 
prohibitive, informed Asphalt International that it was terminating the 
 
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(b). 
133 Id. 
134 The possibilities opened up by section 272(2) are explored in W.F. Young, Half 
Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 33–34 (1981). For a forceful argument that what is 
being opened up here is Pandora’s box, see generally John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of 
Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
135 Commentators have called attention to this problem. See Birmingham, supra note 
22, at 1398 (“As currently conceived, the frustration option does not explicitly permit a 
graduated response to differing equities. Since performance must be either required or 
excused there is generally no solution other than clear victory for one contestant.”); T. 
Ward Chapman, Comment, Contracts – Frustration of Purpose, 59 MICH. L. REV. 98, 117 
(1960) (“In all but three of the twenty-nine holdings [in the author’s survey] relieving the 
frustrated party, the court merely declared all rights and duties under the contract 
terminated by the frustrating event. The courts appear unable to evolve any alternative to 
simple discharge of the contract.”). 
136 Asphalt Int’l, Inc. v. Enter. Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1981). 
137 Id. at 263. 
138 Id. 
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charter, and sold the ship for scrap.139 Enterprise Shipping had an 
incentive to find, as it did, that the vessel was a total loss: it was 
carrying $2,500,000 of marine hull insurance on a ship worth about 
$750,000.140 The trial judge raised an eyebrow at this, but he let it 
pass. Enterprise Shipping collected insurance proceeds in the amount 
of $1,335,000.141 Asphalt protested and then sued. It sought damages 
in the amount of $1,278,831 for lost business and profits.142 So far as 
the court had reason to know, this was the amount by which Asphalt 
International stood to be damaged if Enterprise Shipping was granted 
an unconditional discharge.143 
The trial court held that the carrier’s duty to perform was 
discharged because it was impracticable to repair the ship,144 and the 
Second Circuit affirmed.145 In a smug opinion full of maritime lore, 
Judge Kaufman invoked both UCC section 2-615 and Second 
Restatement section 261.146 The court decided that Asphalt 
International’s damages were immaterial: 
[W]e cannot agree with the argument advanced by Asphalt that 
Enterprise may not enjoy the defense of impracticability because it 
suffered no financial hardship, but rather received a windfall profit 
of $961,000 by virtue of the insurance proceeds it collected. The 
doctrine of commercial impracticability focuses on the 
reasonableness of the expenditure at issue, not upon the ability of a 
party to pay the commercially unreasonable expense.147 
On the issue of discharge, once the court bought into the carrier’s 
numbers, this was the right decision. It would have been unsound to 
require Enterprise Shipping to spend $1,500,000 to repair an old ship 
that stood badly in need of repair when it was rammed. 
At this point, having lost the fight over discharge, Asphalt 
International evidently gave up. That was a bad mistake. Typically, it 
seems, Asphalt International’s lawyers overlooked section 272(2)—a 
 
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 263–64. 
141 Id. at 264. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 264, 267. 
146 Id. at 266 n.4. 
147 Id. at 266. 
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provision that empowered the courts, if an unconditional discharge 
would work an injustice, to set matters right.148 
As a result, the carrier made out like a bandit, and the shipper 
suffered a large uncompensated loss. The law of impracticability, the 
courts and commentators say over and over, is rooted in 
considerations of fairness.149 Surely a court asked to consider a 
remedy for Asphalt International could have seen fit to require 
Enterprise Shipping to cough up some healthy portion of its insurance 
proceeds in the interest of fairness.150 
II 
PROPOSAL 
The defense of impracticability should be framed this way: 
When an event or condition which the promisor reasonably 
assumed would not develop renders his performance impossible or 
impracticable, absent fault on his part and provided that he has not 
assumed the risk of the development, his duty to perform as 
promised is discharged, subject to an obligation to compensate the 
promisee in such amount as justice may require. 
Similar revisions should be made to the law of frustration of 
purpose.151 The changes proposed are these: 
(A) A shared basic assumption should not be required. In order for 
the defenses to succeed, it should neither be necessary nor sufficient 
that the promisee made the same erroneous assumption as the 
promisor. 
(B) Instead, the focus of the inquiry should be whether the 
promisor, in proceeding on the basis of her erroneous assumption, 
acted reasonably. 
(C) The quantitative component of the impracticability defense 
should be recast in terms of hardship to the promisor. 
 
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272 (1981). 
149 See supra note 27. 
150 Cf. Spur Indust., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (in 
nuisance law the price of an injunction is due compensation to the party enjoined). 
151 The revised definition for the defense of frustration of purpose should be: When an 
event or condition which the promisor reasonably assumed would not develop 
substantially frustrates his principal purpose, absent fault on his part and provided that he 
has not assumed the risk of the development, his duty to perform as promised is 
discharged, subject to an obligation to compensate the promisee in such amount as justice 
may require. 
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(D) The problems of fault and the allocation of extraordinary risks 
should be dealt with as they are now, with one minor change. 
(E) When the promisor qualifies for discharge and chooses that 
option, she should be held to acquire thereby a duty to compensate 
the promisee for any resulting loss in such amount as justice may 
require. 
(F) The judicial inquiry into “foreseeability” should be replaced by 
the inquiry into the reasonableness of the promisor’s assumptions. 
The proposed changes will be addressed in that order. 
A. Erroneous Assumption 
The rule must cover, as it does now, both situations in which the 
promisor sees the risk but decides to go ahead and make an absolute 
commitment anyway and situations in which the promisor is 
blindsided. 
Consider the case of Lloyd v. Murphy.152 In August of 1941, the 
Lloyds leased a piece of prime commercial real estate on Wilshire 
Boulevard in Los Angeles to Murphy for five years.153 The lease 
stipulated that Murphy would sell new cars from the premises and 
could not sublease without the Lloyds’ consent.154 
At the time the lease was signed, Pearl Harbor had not yet been 
attacked.155 However, the National Defense Act had been in force for 
more than a year.156 The Act authorized the President to allocate 
materials and mobilize industry for the national defense.157 The 
automotive industry was in the process of conversion to meet the 
needs of the country’s growing mechanized army and to meet lend-
lease commitments to the British.158 Greenland and Iceland had been 
occupied by the Army.159 Automobile sales were spiking, because the 
public anticipated that sales of new cars to ordinary citizens would 
soon be restricted.160 
 
152 Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1944). 
153 Id. at 48. 
154 Id. at 49. 
155 Pearl Harbor was attacked on the morning of December 7, 1941. See Tokyo 
Bombers Strike Hard at Our Main Bases on Oahu, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1941, at 1. 
156 The National Defense Act was enacted on June 28, 1940. Lloyd, 153 P.2d at 51. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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Five months after the lease was signed, the federal government 
took control of the sale of new cars.161 At first only military personnel 
could buy them.162 Shortly thereafter, the Government established a 
system of priorities under which sales were restricted to buyers who 
had a high preferential rating.163 
Back on Wilshire Boulevard, as he later testified, Murphy found he 
“couldn’t make a go” of the new car business.164 He blamed the 
action of the government, and sought to cancel the lease on grounds 
of commercial frustration.165 
From the report of the case, it is impossible to tell, as it often is, 
whether when Murphy signed the lease he saw the handwriting on the 
wall and ignored it, or whether he was oblivious. Promisors often 
maintain they were blindsided by events, even when that is hard to 
believe. It should not matter. The question is (or should be) whether 
the promisor’s assumption that an event or condition would not 
develop was reasonable. If a reasonable person in Murphy’s position 
would have seen the signs that the clientele for new cars was about to 
shrink drastically and would have refused to commit himself without 
qualification to sell new cars from the lot for that reason, the court 
was right to enforce the commitment. This is true regardless of 
whether Murphy was merely imprudent or totally clueless. And it is 
true whether or not the Lloyds happened to be as benighted as 
Murphy was. 
B. Reasonable Assumption 
Courts generally do not address head-on the question of whether 
the promisor’s assumption was reasonable. Many courts, however, do 
assign importance to the “foreseeability” of the unwelcome event. 
Sometimes focusing on the second question rather than the first leads 
to anomalous results. 
In the peculiar case of Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation 
Inc., where a train carrying promised combat boots crashed en route 
 
161 Id. at 48–49. 
162 Id. at 49. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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and the goods were destroyed,166 the court declined to hold the seller 
discharged on grounds of impracticability because it could have 
foreseen the train wreck.167 
On the facts, it seems more than merely possible that nobody in the 
seller’s organization gave a train wreck a moment’s forethought. 
Suppose, however, the contrary. Suppose, just for fun, that the 
operations manager, having perhaps been burned before by her 
superiors for failure to think ahead, asked her director of fulfillment to 
come up with a list of events that might cause the combat boots to fail 
to arrive in merchantable shape. Suppose the resourceful director 
came up with a list of thirty-seven such events, ranging from the 
plausible (shortage of railroad cars, flash flood) to the preposterous 
(destruction of the boots by spontaneous combustion, a meteor 
shower, the action of an evil wizard). And suppose a train wreck was 
on the list. 
Now, if, as the court thought, the controlling question was whether 
a train wreck was foreseeable,168 the buyer would be entitled to 
prevail. The revolting development was not just foreseeable, it was 
foreseen. But clearly that’s the wrong question. The question should 
be whether the seller, having consciously adverted to the possibility 
of a train wreck, acted reasonably in disregarding it. And in the 
absence of any fact in the record that would have put the seller on 
notice that a train wreck was appreciably more likely than a meteor 
shower, the court’s decision was not only wrong, but silly. 
In this context, it appears, reasonableness is a function of two 
things: the probability that an event or condition will develop, and the 
severity of harm if it does.169 As a practical matter, the question is 
whether the damage from a particular development would be so great 
and so likely to occur that the promisor should insist on appropriate 
exculpatory language or suffer consequences. So far as severity is 
concerned, we are only interested in developments that will render 
performance impracticable or that will substantially frustrate the 
promisor’s principal purpose. Recall that the director of fulfillment 
was given the job of coming up with a list of things that would cause 
 
166 Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982), aff’d, 722 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983). 
167 Id. at 1022. 
168 Id. 
169 I am grateful to Gregory Stein for suggesting this line of analysis. 
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the combat boots not to reach their destination in salable condition. 
Suppose the director had recently seen on television that mice like to 
breed in railway cars and included mice on the list of possible events. 
Given a great likelihood of mice, the operations manager might like to 
have mice in her force majeure clause. Assume, however, that based 
on everything she had reason to know, if mice did get at the boots, the 
damage they could do would not rise to the necessary level. Of 
course, she might be wrong about that. It might turn out that mice can 
do grievous harm to combat boots. However, on the facts assumed, if 
she were to decide not to clutter up the negotiations and the contract 
with a proviso regarding mice, and if mice turned out to be a really 
serious problem after all, that should not defeat the seller’s 
impracticability defense. 
A meteor shower would be a different matter. It is unlikely that the 
boots would survive a direct hit. However, that only answers the 
question of severity. It remains to consider probability. The 
operations manager would be entitled to take notice of the fact that 
meteor showers are exceedingly rare. Once again, if she decided not 
to press for exculpatory language and the boots perished in a meteor 
shower, her impracticability defense should remain intact. And so it is 
with respect to spontaneous combustion, the intervention of an evil 
wizard, and also—one would think—a train wreck. 
Sometimes an additional variable enters in. Sometimes—though 
surely not in the train wreck case—the promisor knows or has reason 
to know of facts that would prompt a reasonable person to make 
inquiries. This was the situation in Renner v. Kehl, the case in which 
the purchasers of property in Arizona on which they intended to grow 
jojoba were excused from their commitment because they could not 
find water.170 They discovered that there was no water when, after 
they had contracted to buy the property, they ran tests.171 Obviously, 
then, good tests were feasible. Surely the fact that this was property in 
a notoriously dry state, on which nothing was growing,172 should 
have alerted the buyers to the wisdom of running those tests before 
they made the commitment to buy. Even if, as the courts thought, the 
sellers shared the buyers’ assumption about available water,173 that 
 
170 Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262, 265 (Ariz. 1986). 
171 Id. at 264. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 265. 
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assumption on the buyers’ part was unreasonable. Their commitment 
to buy the property willy-nilly should have been enforced. 
Compare these cases with the case of Sunflower Electric 
Cooperative v. Tomlinson Oil.174 Tomlinson, an experienced 
producer of natural gas, contracted to supply the Sunflower Electric 
Cooperative with a minimum of three million cubic feet of gas per 
day for a minimum of four years from a location in Kansas, the 
Stranger Creek field.175 As part of the deal, each party agreed to build 
a pipeline, at its own expense.176 At the time the parties entered into 
the contract, the Stranger Creek field was not producing.177 It was 
located not far from the McLouth Field, which had been producing 
gas in commercial quantities for some time.178 
Tomlinson commissioned studies and analyzed the yield from 
twelve wells in the Stranger Creek field, six of which it dug for 
testing purposes.179 It interpreted the results as promising.180 On the 
strength of those results, Tomlinson entered into a binding long-term 
commitment.181 The contract included a force majeure clause that the 
courts determined did not cover the contingency that later arose.182 
Contrary to the assumption of both parties, the Stranger Creek field 
was a disaster.183 In Sunflower’s suit for specific performance or 
damages, Tomlinson pled impracticability.184 In a thoughtful opinion, 
 
174 Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc., v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 638 P.2d 963 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1981). 
175 Id. at 964–65. 
176 Id. at 965. 
177 Id. at 966. 
178 Id. at 965. 
179 Id. at 966–67. 
180 Id. at 967. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 973–74. 
183 Id. at 966, 968 (“As production declined, Tomlinson found heavy oil fouling up all 
of its separators, tubing and meters. Kerosene and steam would not clean this equipment. 
The oil changed to a solid-like asphalt. A sample of the heavy oil from the Pauley # 1 well 
was found to have a viscosity of 100,000 centipoise at 100° F with a pour point of 90° F. 
Normal crude oil has a viscosity of 10 to 100 centipoise. Because of the heavy oil 
problem, Tomlinson decided not to spend any additional time or money in developing or 
producing in the Stranger Creek field. . . . From [the] conflicting testimony the trial court 
found: [t]hat the gas in the Stranger Creek field is exhausted and that heavy oil is a 
problem only because of the depletion of gas. The Tomlinson estimates of reserves when 
the contract was signed were over optimistic.” (second alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
184 Id. at 963. 
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the Court of Appeals of Kansas denied specific performance, but held 
Tomlinson liable in damages.185 It rejected Tomlinson’s defense on 
two grounds. First, Tomlinson should have foreseen the problem.186 
Second, as an experienced producer with knowledge and expertise 
that the other party did not have, it assumed the risk.187 
It was, of course, reasonably foreseeable to Tomlinson that the 
Stranger Creek field would prove to be a disappointment. 
Anticipating the problem, it commissioned studies and ran tests. The 
difficulty was that those inquiries did not dispel the uncertainty.188 
Though Tomlinson conducted a responsible investigation, its 
assumption, based on the results, that gas would be available in 
commercial quantities, could fairly be characterized as unreasonable. 
That, in any case, was what the appellate court thought.189 If the court 
was correct, the court was right to hold Tomlinson to the bargain. 
The result is a harsh one, because Tomlinson did almost everything 
right. Its mistake was committing to the deal without the protection of 
a nice, tight force majeure clause. And of course Sunflower, which 
wanted a guaranteed long-term source of supply at a tolerable price 
and was willing to spring for a pipeline to reach one, might well have 
refused to agree to such a clause. But if the result is harsh, there is no 
help for it. A party who chooses improvidently to gamble on a known 
substantial risk cannot be excused from performing if the gamble 
fails. 
C. Event or Condition 
In running an impracticability analysis, there is no good reason to 
distinguish, as the Second Restatement does, between events and 
 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 971. 
187 Id. 
188 See id. at 966 (“Prior to entering into the contract with Sunflower in November of 
1973, Tomlinson had purchased 6 wells and drilled 6 wells. Of these twelve wells, only 
five . . . were potential producers, with the remainder being dry holes or abandoned as not 
commercial. Multipoint back pressure tests, most of which were performed in October, 
1972, by Cities Service revealed gas flows for these five wells. . . . A multipoint back 
pressure test measures the relationship of short-term gas flow to the back pressure of a 
pipeline but is not a measure of the well’s long-term capacity or the gas reserves. The 
presence of heavy oil in all these wells was noted early.”). 
189 See id. at 973. 
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conditions.190 The appropriate standard, the standard of 
reasonableness, is the same for both. 
Suppose the test results in Sunflower had been more reassuring, but 
the Stranger Creek field was located twenty miles from a field that 
had been producing nicely until geological shifts introduced water 
into the underground site, hopelessly contaminating it. Those 
geological shifts would be enough to put a reasonable producer in 
Tomlinson’s position on notice that it had better inquire into the 
likelihood that something similar would happen at the Stranger Creek 
field. Suppose that the results of the inquiry were equivocal, as they 
were in the actual case, but Tomlinson elected to proceed anyway. 
Applying the standard of reasonableness, the court’s question would 
be exactly the same—was Tomlinson’s optimistic assumption 
reasonable—and so would the consequences. The fact that the 
revolting development was a condition, rather than an event, should 
not in itself prejudice the promisor’s case. 
D. Impossible and Impracticable 
The cases of strict impossibility are in a class of their own. When 
the chosen hall burns or the chosen painter dies, no troublesome 
questions of degree arise. 
It appears that the courts have protected this class of promisors to a 
greater extent than makes sense. By and large, on the issues of 
foreseeability and assumption of the risk, courts have given those 
promisors a free pass. Consider Taylor v. Caldwell, the case of the 
concert hall that burned prior to the last performance.191 The opinion 
of the King’s Bench in that case is widely regarded as the source of 
the modern doctrine of impossibility.192 The hall was destroyed; 
performance was impossible; end of discussion. There was no inquiry 
into the frequency of fires in the district, the composition of the 
exterior (was it a wooden structure?), or the preparations or lack of 
preparations made for fire. 
That was wrong; someone should have inquired. Suppose a 
booking agent contracts to furnish a particular band for a particular 
concert, and before the concert the band breaks up. It is impossible for 
the booking agent to perform. The band, we might say, “brought this 
 
190 See supra Part I.B and notes 129–30. 
191 Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.) 309. 
192 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 26, at 85 n.7. 
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on itself.” But this is not the case for the booking agent, who is the 
one on the hook. However, not so fast. Bands break up. How much 
did the agent know about the internal dynamics of the band? In light 
of what she knew, was it reasonable for her to make an unqualified 
commitment? The fact that the band’s performance has become not 
merely impracticable, but impossible, should not immunize the 
booking agent from having to face this question. 
As noted above, in cases where a revolting development has 
rendered performance not impossible but unexpectedly expensive, 
courts have not come up with a good solution to the problem of what 
might be called “quantitative impracticability.” There is probably no 
good way to solve it in the rule itself. However, the gloss on the rule 
can and should focus the inquiry. 
When the promisee refuses to acquiesce in the promisor’s request 
to be relieved of her duty on grounds of impracticability, the chances 
are that the promisee has something to lose. The lost benefit may 
simply be a portion of his expectancy—rent, royalty payments, goods 
at a favorable price. It may be that in the expectation of receiving that 
benefit, the promisee has made extensive expenditures in reliance, as 
on a pipeline to transport natural gas or the adaptation of railway cars 
to a specific purpose. It may be that the promisee has incurred 
substantial opportunity costs. 
One may well ask why, in the name of impracticability, the 
promisee should be deprived of the benefit of the bargain, unless the 
unwelcome event either renders performance impossible or increases 
the promisor’s costs to the point of hardship. Suppose that a 
whopping increase in the cost of inputs reduces the promisor’s unit 
profit, but performance remains profitable.193 The promisor does not 
have a compelling case for extricating herself at the promisee’s 
expense. Indeed, it is hard to see why fairness requires that the law 
intervene to protect the promisor, to the promisee’s loss and damage, 
if the worst the promisor can say is that if she is compelled to 
complete the promised performance, she will break even. 
Perhaps, then, as has been suggested,194 the touchstone of 
quantitative impracticability should be hardship. Forced to send the S. 
 
193 In this context, “profitable” means that the contract price exceeds the cost of 
performance. 
194 See Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 949–50 (1942) (quoting section 454 of the first Restatement of Contracts: “That the 
degree of hardship caused to the promisor is influential in determining what facts 
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S. Christos around the Cape of Good Hope, the carrier transporting 
the Government’s wheat should have to show, not that its costs 
increased by some elusive multiple, but that it now stood to lose 
money on the trip. 
How much money should the performing party have to lose? More 
than a token amount, to be sure. But suppose the de minimis principle 
does not dispose of the case. From the standpoint of clarity it would 
be splendid if proof of any degree of hardship were enough to trigger 
the defense. That would not, however, be a good solution. In practice, 
unforeseen contingencies arise all the time. Rational firms know that 
some percentage of their contracts will turn into losers, and budget for 
it. If proof of any degree of hardship, no matter how slight, were 
enough, an overwhelming number of contracts would qualify for the 
impracticability defense—far more than makes any sense. 
If some degree of hardship is a necessary condition for recovery, 
but not a sufficient one, this line of analysis will not put an end to the 
numbers game.195 The most that can be said is that it will point the 
inquiry in the right direction. The courts will be addressing real 
questions. First, would the promisor have suffered any actual harm 
from completing performance? And, if so, how much harm should a 
promisor who has acted responsibly be required to suffer before the 
law will come to her aid? 
If hardship is the touchstone, some difficult questions remain. How 
exactly is the accounting to be done? What if the promisor is so large 
 
constitute frustrations excusing promisors, is scarcely to be doubted. The recognition that 
‘impossibility’ includes ‘impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, 
expense, injury or loss involved,” is an implicit recognition of this factor.’”(footnotes 
omitted)). For a noteworthy decision and opinion reflecting this view, see generally E. Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975). In a long-term contract 
first entered into in 1959 and renewed with amendments, Gulf contracted to meet 
Eastern’s requirements for airplane fuel at certain airports. Id. at 432. The fuel was refined 
by Gulf from crude oil supplied mainly by domestic producers at prices regulated by the 
government. In the early 1970s, a series of events occurred that resulted in a drop in 
domestic production, with a corresponding increase in the importation of foreign crude oil, 
the price of which was not regulated by the government. Id. at 433. Computed by the 
method chosen by Gulf, Gulf’s costs rose steeply. Id. at 434. When the parties were unable 
to agree on a price adjustment, Eastern sued Gulf to enforce the contract. Gulf defended on 
the ground of impracticability. Id. at 432. The court held that performance was not 
impracticable because if Gulf had performed, it would have suffered no hardship. Id. at 
440. 
195 The reference is to the courts’ fruitless search for some magic multiple by which the 
promisor’s costs must have increased in order for performance to be held to be 
impracticable. See supra text accompanying notes 116–26. 
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or doing so well that requiring it to operate at a loss on this one 
contract will not cause serious financial harm? What if the promisor, 
in the exercise of foresight, insured against the risk? 
These are not new questions. Past cases suggest possible 
answers.196 
E. Fault and the Allocation of Extraordinary Risks 
This Article proposes no changes to the law stated in this section of 
the Second Restatement, except for an explicit reference in the rule to 
assumption of extraordinary risks by the promisor. 
F. Remedy197 
As noted above,198 though the Restatement contains a provision 
that could serve to draw attention to the possible need for some kind 
of remedy for the promisee in the event that the promisor’s duty is 
discharged, the provision has seldom been invoked. 
A good example of what can happen when a thoughtful court 
squarely addresses this problem is supplied by the opinion of the 
federal district judge in Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group.199 
The Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) and Essex had 
 
196 Concerning the relevance of the promisor’s financial condition on the issue of 
whether increased costs have rendered performance impracticable, compare E. Air Lines, 
Inc., 415 F. Supp. at 441, with Asphalt Int’l, Inc. v. Enter. Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d 
261, 266 (2d Cir. 1981). Richard Duesenberg has explored some of the ramifications of the 
court’s opinion in Eastern Air Lines: 
What is impracticable for one seller might not be for another. The difference 
could be attributable to size, profitability, management capabilities, competence 
of engineers, scientists, and almost any other of the many qualities which 
distinguish individual from individual and organization from organization . . . . 
[I]n the surge of cases spawned by recent inflationary conditions, most of the 
opinions seem to search for a magical mathematical line past which an increase 
in costs would support an impracticability defense. That yearning is implicit 
when relief is denied because of the absence of any precedence for granting it 
where the cost increase is “something less than 100% . . . .” A 100% cost 
increase to some sellers might be disastrous; to others, the profit and loss charts 
might not even register a minor blip. 
Duesenberg, supra note 21, at 1094 (quoting Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 
17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975)). 
197 In a recent article, Professor Eisenberg explores this neglected aspect of revolting 
developments jurisprudence. See Eisenberg 2009, supra note 25, at 225–47. 
198 See supra Part I.B.4. 
199 Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W. D. Pa. 1980). 
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signed a long-term contract in which ALCOA agreed to smelt 
alumina furnished by Essex into molten aluminum, which Essex 
would then collect.200 The contract contained a price escalation clause 
tied to ALCOA’s non-labor production costs: three cents per pound of 
the original price was to increase in accordance with increases in the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Wholesale Price Index for Industrial 
Commodities (the WPI-IC).201 As the contract progressed, ALCOA’s 
non-labor production costs increased so much faster than the WPI-IC 
that, according to ALCOA’s calculations, if the contract were 
enforced according to its terms, it stood to lose $60 million.202 The 
court accepted ALCOA’s calculations.203 
ALCOA sought relief on many theories. Judge Teitelbaum held 
that it was entitled to prevail on several, including impracticability.204 
To succeed on this theory, ALCOA had to first overcome Essex’s 
argument that production cost increases are not normally considered 
events that will sustain an impracticability claim.205 Then, it had to 
overcome the argument that by committing itself in the contract to a 
price escalation formula of its own design, ALCOA assumed the risk 
that the formula would not prove to be an accurate predictor of its 
production costs.206 Judge Teitelbaum distinguished the cases in 
which promisors who agreed to price escalation clauses were held to 
have assumed the risk.207 Concerning quantitative impracticability, he 
noted that “[t]he focus of the doctrines of impracticability and 
frustration is distinctly on hardship.”208 He concluded that 
[t]his strict standard of severe disappointment is clearly met in the 
present case. ALCOA has sufficiently proved that it will lose $60 
million dollars out of pocket over the life of the contract due to the 
extreme deviation of the WPI-IC from Alcoa’s actual costs.209 
 
200 Id. at 53. 
201 Id. at 58. 
202 Id. at 53. 
203 Id. at 66. 
204 Id. at 76. 
205 Id. at 73. 
206 Id. at 68. 
207 Id. at 68–70. 
208 Id. at 72. 
209 Id. at 73. 
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The question of remedy remained. ALCOA had not prayed for 
discharge, but for an “equitable modification” of the contract.210 Why 
it did so is not clear; perhaps its lawyers thought ALCOA had a shot 
at getting a new price term that would make the contract profitable 
again. If so, they were right. The court, however, was careful to note 
that “equitable” had to mean, fair to everyone.211 Essex too had 
interests that were entitled to protection: 
To decree rescission in this case would be to grant ALCOA a 
windfall gain in the current aluminum market. It would at the same 
time deprive Essex of the assured long term aluminum supply 
which it obtained under the contract and of the gains it legitimately 
may enforce within the scope of the risk ALCOA bears under the 
contract. A remedy which merely shifts the windfall gains and 
losses is neither required nor permitted by Indiana law. . . . A 
remedy modifying the price term of the contract . . . will better 
preserve the purposes and expectations of the parties than any other 
remedy. Such a remedy is essential to avoid injustice in this case.212 
In light of all this, Judge Teitelbaum wrote a new formula for the 
parties that guaranteed to ALCOA a one percent profit per pound of 
aluminum converted.213 He relieved ALCOA of all hardship, but 
required it to settle for one percent rather than the four percent profit 
it claimed to have anticipated when it embarked on the deal.214 
What exactly the new arrangement would do for Essex does not 
clearly emerge from the opinion. The judge said that the new term 
would “generally yield Essex the benefit of its favorable bargain.”215 
His decision was appealed. At oral argument, the court let it be known 
that it thought Judge Teitelbaum’s decision was too favorable to 
ALCOA; whereupon, without waiting for a decision on appeal, the 
parties resumed negotiations and settled on new terms.216 
Judge Teitelbaum’s decision, which had the useful effect of forcing 
the parties back to the bargaining table to make a new agreement for 
themselves, was creative. It is not the only such decision in the 
 
210 Id. at 57. 
211 Id. at 79. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 80. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 475–76 
(1985). 
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reported cases, but there are not many.217 Perhaps this is attributable 
to the courts’ often-avowed reluctance to “make a contract for the 
parties.” In fact, what the reported cases suggest is not so much that, 
as that courts are simply very seldom tasked by promisees in these 
cases to impose conditions on the discharge of the promisors’ 
obligations. 
Perhaps there should simply be a standing condition: If the 
promisor opts for discharge, she must compensate the promisee in 
such amount as justice may require. Protection of the promisee’s 
interests should become not an occasional thing, but the norm. 
Despite what some courts say about rewriting the parties’ contract 
for them, it happens all the time.218 In fact, in effect, the default rules 
 
217 There is extensive literature on the case. See id. at 465, 475–76 n.59. See generally 
Stewart Macaulay, The Real and Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, 
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44 (2003). For a 
particularly thoughtful appreciation of the decision and opinion in Aluminum Co. of 
America v. Essex Group, see Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under 
Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369, 370–81 (1981). For a vigorous 
statement of the opposing view, see generally Dawson, supra note 134. 
 Though goods were involved in the Essex Group transaction, the contract was a contract 
for services—ALCOA’s commitment was to smelt the ore furnished by Essex. Thus the 
UCC did not apply. As Professor Speidel has noted, however, “the spirit if not the precise 
content” of the court’s remedy “is caught by the intriguing comments to section 2-615 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, which state that when ‘neither sense nor justice’ is served 
by an either/or answer on discharge, changed circumstances may ‘require . . . a good faith 
inquiry seeking a readjustment of the contract terms.’” Speidel, supra, at 416. 
218 As Judge Clark wrote candidly for the Second Circuit many years ago in Parev 
Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons: 
 Should, therefore, a covenant be implied under all the present circumstances? 
When we turn to the precedents we are met at once with the confusion of 
statement whether a covenant can be implied only if it was clearly “intended” by 
the parties, or whether such a covenant can rest on principles of equity. . . . One 
may perhaps conclude that in large measure this confusion arises out of the 
reluctance of courts to admit that they were to a considerable extent “remaking” 
a contract in situations where it seemed necessary and appropriate so to do. 
“Intention of the parties” is a good formula by which to square doctrine with 
result. That this is true has long been an open secret. Of course, where intent, 
though obscure, is nevertheless discernible, it must be followed; but a certain 
sophistication must be recognized—if we are to approach the matter frankly—
where we are dealing with changed circumstances, fifteen years later, with 
respect to a contract which does not touch this exact point and which has at most 
only points of departure for more or less pressing analogies. 
Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (1941) (citations and footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added); Z. Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. 
REV. 381, 398 (1941); L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (1930); 
Holmes, supra note 70, at 466. 
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on impracticability and frustration do exactly that. They give the 
promisor an avenue of escape she did not bargain for. They are the 
functional equivalent of a good force majeure clause, interpolated into 
the contract and bestowed upon a promisor without her ever having 
had to negotiate for it. 
Under the law as it operates now, discharge comes too cheaply. 
The default should be quid pro quo: If the promisor wants out based 
on a contingency she did not plan for, she should be required to do 
right by the promisee. This will introduce an element of uncertainty 
into every decision to claim a discharge based on a revolting 
development. Obviously the promisor cannot know for sure what a 
court would decide that the promisee is entitled to as a matter of 
justice. Such an element of uncertainty is present, however, in every 
considered decision to break a contract. The informed prospective 
breaching party knows that she may be liable in damages and almost 
never knows for certain what the extent of that liability will be. Often 
in such cases, the prospective victim will happily provide relevant 
information. In any event, in impracticability and frustration cases, 
the promisor can reasonably expect that she will not be taxed with the 
full extent of the promisee’s damages. In those cases, unlike the cases 
involving simple breach, her failure to complete performance is 
justified. 
Possibly the promisor will conclude that it is not worth the risk and 
will go ahead and render the impracticable performance, pouring 
money down a rat-hole. In assessing the likelihood that this will 
happen, it is worth remembering that, by hypothesis, the promisor is 
unexpectedly facing “extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, 
injury, or loss.”219 The cost of continuing performance is likely to 
loom large in the promisor’s calculations. Taking the Asphalt case as 
an example and using the ship owner’s figures, its choice would be 
between (1) spending $1,500,000 to repair a decrepit ship worth far 
less than that, and (2) recovering $1,335,000 in insurance proceeds, 
plus the salvage value of the ship, some of which it would then have 
to share.220 Not, one would think, a hard choice. 
It should be clear that the promisor’s discharge is not contingent on 
making a fair arrangement with the promisee. To provide otherwise 
would leave matters in too uncertain a state in those instances in 
 
219 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. d (1981). 
220 See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
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which the parties cannot agree on the promisee’s due. Once the 
promisor has opted for discharge, her election should be binding on 
the parties. But when she elects discharge, she should be held to 
acquire, in consequence, an obligation to the promisee to pay fair 
compensation. 
G. Foreseeability 
The drafters of the Second Restatement chose not to make 
foreseeability a bar to discharge, and explained why in the comments 
to section 261.221 Notwithstanding that, even courts purporting to 
apply the Second Restatement provision or its UCC counterpart have 
read a foreseeability bar into the law. 
In cases, foreseeability operates as a kind of wild card. On the one 
hand, we have cases like Bende & Sons, in which a seller was denied 
a discharge on the ground that it should have foreseen a train 
wreck.222 On the other hand, there are cases like the jojoba case, 
Renner v. Kehl, in which the court permitted the buyers of useless real 
property to rescind their contact because of a condition they should 
surely have foreseen.223 
The doctrine of foreseeability has performed one useful service: It 
has directed the courts’ attention to the question of whether the 
promisor, in proceeding on an erroneous assumption, acted 
reasonably. The case of the hapless Murphy, who ignored the 
indications apparent to others that the high retail price of new cars at 
the outset of the government’s wartime preparations was a bubble, is 
an excellent case in point.224 So is Sunflower, the case of the 
unrecoverable natural gas.225 In Sunflower, both parties to the 
contract assumed that the designated field would be productive, but 
Tomlinson, an experienced natural gas producer staring at a group of 
equivocal studies and ambiguous test results, should have known 
better. 
 
221 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. b (1981) (“The fact that the event was 
foreseeable, or even foreseen, does not necessarily compel a conclusion that its non-
occurrence was not a basic assumption.”). 
222 See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra notes 152–65 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra notes 174–90 and accompanying text. 
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With that said, all of the good done by the foreseeability doctrine 
can be done, and all of the mischief avoided, by inquiring explicitly 
into whether it was reasonable for the promisor to make the 
assumption she did. Once this becomes the standard inquiry and 
proper provision has been made for the allocation of extraordinary 
risks to the promisor, the doctrine of foreseeability should be interred. 
CONCLUSION 
If all of the elements of the proposal are adopted, the revised 
definition of the defense of impracticability would be: 
 When an event or condition which the promisor reasonably 
assumed would not develop renders his performance impossible or 
impracticable, absent fault on his part and provided that he has not 
assumed the risk of the development, his duty to perform as 
promised is discharged, subject to an obligation to compensate the 
promisee in such amount as justice may require. 
The defense of frustration of purpose would be similarly redefined.226 
It should be noted that, with one exception, the elements of the 
proposal are independent of one another. 
 The requirement of a shared assumption should be dropped. If a 
court decided it was unwilling to make that much law, since 
arguably a shared basic assumption is more likely to be 
reasonable than one entertained by one party alone, proof of a 
shared assumption might still be held to satisfy the rule. Such 
proof should not, however, be required. If the promisor acted 
reasonably in assuming what she assumed, that should be 
enough. 
 Though the word “impracticable” has given rise to a lot of 
confusion, the major surgery required to substitute something 
else for it is not warranted. What is important is that the 
touchstone should be understood to be hardship to the promisor. 
 Whatever the law is, it should be the same for events and 
conditions, but this is a minor point. 
 
226 When, as a result of an event or condition which the promisor reasonably assumed 
would not develop, his principal purpose is substantially frustrated, absent fault on his part 
and provided that he has not assumed the risk of the development, his duty to perform as 
promised is discharged, subject to an obligation to compensate the promisee in such 
amount as justice may require. 
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 An explicit reference to assumption of the risk would also be 
desirable, but is not critical. 
 The law should require that in any judicially sanctioned 
discharge based on impracticability or frustration, the legitimate 
interests of the promisee be identified and protected. While the 
other elements of the proposal are still worth adopting, it would 
be disappointing if this change was not made. A court might or 
might not choose, as a means to this end, to structure the law so 
as to require the promisor, at the time she elects to treat her duty 
as discharged, to compensate the promisee for at least part of the 
resulting damage. 
 The one recommendation that is contingent on the others is that 
the promisee should not be able to defeat the promisor’s case by 
showing that the unwelcome development was “foreseeable” to 
the promisor. This factor, read out of the rules by the drafters of 
the Second Restatement, has crept into decisions and become 
embedded. It has sewn endless confusion, and in some cases it 
has prevented the courts from doing justice. It should be 
relegated to history, in favor of a requirement that it be 
reasonable for the promisor to make the assumption she did. 
These are not radical proposals. Treating events and conditions the 
same, and calling assumption of the risk by that name, are tweaks. 
The requirement that the promisor’s assumption be reasonable is 
already foreshadowed in many jurisdictions by the notion of 
foreseeability. Casting the quantitative component of the 
impracticability defense in terms of hardship to the promisor focuses 
an inquiry that has already tended to proceed in that direction. The 
existing rules provide for remedies for the injured promisee, so the 
only strenuous change would be to task the promisor specifically to 
do the right thing. 
The proposed changes to the law would clear up some unnecessary 
confusion. More importantly, however, the proposed changes would 
aid the courts in doing justice, relieving promisors of burdens so 
severe that enforcement of their bargains according to the original 
terms would be unfair, while protecting the legitimate interests of 
promisees as well. 
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APPENDIX 
THE REQUIREMENT OF A SHARED ASSUMPTION227 
As noted in the text,228 there is an argument to be made for 
requiring, in revolting development cases, that the promisor’s 
erroneous assumption be not only reasonable, but shared by the 
promisee. The argument, however, is not conclusive. 
Suppose these facts: A key element in the making of Manufacturer 
M’s principal product is thallium. Thallium is rarely found in nature 
and is difficult to synthesize. It is available in the United States only 
from a handful of firms, each of which imports it from mines in a 
developing country, where its production is lucrative. M is aware that 
governments in developing countries sometimes nationalize profitable 
industries. Knowing this, it passes up offers of thallium from firms 
that insist on price escalation clauses or force majeure clauses in their 
contracts. Instead, M enters into a long-term contract with supplier S, 
who is willing to make an unqualified commitment to supply thallium 
at a fixed price. The government of the country where S mines 
thallium nationalizes production of the product, restricts supply, and 
raises the price. This has the effect of increasing the price of thallium 
on the world market. It is no longer possible for S to cover its costs at 
the price stated in the contract with M. S seeks to get out and claims 
impracticability. 
Assuming that the price of thallium to S rises to the point that 
continuing to perform the contract will result in substantial hardship, 
S’s principal difficulty will be in proving that its assumption that the 
price would not rise significantly was reasonable. One obstacle will 
be that its competitors, who insisted on price escalation or force 
majeure clauses, apparently assumed the contrary. But it is hard to 
know in advance what a court will consider to have been a reasonable 
assumption, and S will press the point that no government anywhere 
has previously nationalized its country’s thallium mines. 
Under the Second Restatement rule, M has another argument. S 
must prove not only that its assumption about price was reasonable, 
but also that M made the same assumption. Perhaps M is in a position 
to refute that completely, through internal correspondence and 
memoranda in its files. Under the Restatement rule, that will kill S’s 
 
227 I am indebted to Robert Lloyd for suggesting this line of analysis. 
228 See supra note 110. 
WIRTZ 12/20/2012  12:11 PM 
374 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 325 
defense. But without the shared-assumption requirement, what M 
assumed, though it will be relevant on the issue of reasonableness, 
will no longer be controlling. M will be forced to choose between 
taking its chances on this issue in litigation, and acquiescing in S’s 
demand for an adjustment in the price. And this will be true, though it 
exercised reasonable foresight, and arguably, at least, S did not. That 
is not a good outcome. 
Now suppose different facts. Since thallium represented a small 
part of M’s manufacturing costs, and the thallium market had been 
stable for years, M gave little thought to the possibility that the supply 
would be interrupted. The suppliers were equally untroubled, and M 
had its choice of suppliers who were willing to enter into fixed-price 
contracts without force majeure clauses. It chose S because S 
consistently supplied high-grade thallium. When Kazakhstan, a U.S. 
ally, nationalized its thallium mines, causing the world price to rise 
significantly, everyone was stunned. 
S’s claim to impracticability now looks much better. S’s argument 
that the assumptions it made were reasonable is strong. But under the 
Second Restatement rule, S will lose unless it can prove that M shared 
those assumptions. And it probably can’t do that. It has no earthly 
way of knowing, let alone proving, what M assumed. Perhaps, in fact, 
there is a memorandum somewhere in M’s files suggesting that an 
executive at M was mildly concerned that some government, perhaps 
Indonesia’s, would take action that would raise the world price of 
thallium. By taking a hard line, M can force S to choose between (1) 
speculating on the outcome of litigation on this issue, or (2) 
abandoning its meritorious claim to a price adjustment. That is not a 
good outcome, either. 
